CRISIS OR NOT? ADEQUATE RESPONSE OR NOT? THE EU IN 2015-2017

Boldizsár Nagy's presentation at the

Expert Meeting on Border and Migration Management in

Emergency Situations

Budapest, 23 March 2017

МОТТО NO. 1


"..UNHCR's record budget for 2016 is substantially lower than the amount US consumers spend each year on Halloween decorations, costumes and candy"

6.5 billion USD

Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Nikolas F. Tan: The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy, *Journal of Migration and Human Security* Volume 5 Number 1 (2017): 28-56

EUROPEAN DATA

NUMBER OF ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN EU+ EU 28 + NORWAY AND SWITZERLAND




Source: Latest asylum trends – 2016 overview, p. 1 https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Latest%20Asylum%20Trends%20Overview%202016%20final.pdf

APPLICATIONS IN THE EU+, 2016-2017

GEO/TIME	2016M01	2016M02	2016M03	2016M04	2016M05	2016M06	2016M07	2016M08	2016M09	2016M10	2016M11	2016M12	2017M01	2017M02
European L	101 110	113 955	106 085	109 640	103 420	123 955	118 970	138 110	123 310	82 620	74 690	62 985	28 470	18 535
Belgium	2 840	1 515	1 370	1 190	1 185	1 075	1 275	1 665	1 420	1 665	1 525	1 555	1 455	1 415
Bulgaria	1 965	1 195	1 040	1 105	1 115	1 425	1 545	2 815	2 075	2 570	1 755	815	420	*
Czech Rep	110	180	130	150	95	105	110	125	130	145	100	105	-	-
Denmark	1 650	910	470	405	370	470	400	295	305	350	285	260	225	41 41
Germany (L	59 070	74 865	67 300	67 865	61 295	80 750	78 665	94 350	78 425	34 270	27 745	20 550	17 940	16 550
Estonia	0	5	10	20	35	15	15	10	20	25	25	5	:	1
Ireland	215	195	140	155	140	155	165	195	220	185	225	260	*	*
Greece	1 170	1 470	2 955	3 700	4 280	4 255	4 010	3 530	5 125	6 270	7 625	6 715	*	:
Spain	1 105	935	890	1 165	1 325	1 510	1 025	1 225	1 320	1 760	1 935	1 565	2 125	£2
France	6 120	6 960	6 980	6 650	6 545	6 865	6 590	7 655	7 465	7 435	6 680	7 550		*
Croatia	45	60	165	195	105	100	95	230	365	400	265	190	4	1
Italy	7 495	7 680	7 395	7 980	9 220	9 910	11 060	11 455	12 460	13 495	13 615	11 195	1	\$6
Cyprus	225	240	200	185	180	165	230	220	275	355	405	260	\$5	5 0
Latvia	10	15	10	40	5	45	25	30	25	55	60	30	:	1
Lithuania	10	10	25	10	15	45	40	65	40	100	55	15	:	:
Luxembour	270	135	110	130	125	175	140	200	205	285	175	205	:	+
Hungary	435	2 175	4 575	5 810	4 750	4 745	1 865	1 400	1 120	1 200	730	630	+	*
Malta	110	140	180	115	140	185	155	190	175	240	165	125	:	*
Netherland	2 680	1 920	1 330	1 110	1 115	1 260	1 690	1 905	1 995	2 170	2 070	1 700	1 550	()
Austria	5 925	5 110	3 345	4 170	3 860	3 190	3 075	3 260	2 605	2 595	2 360	2 455	2 215	2
Poland	680	965	1 230	1 315	1 550	1 655	1 185	940	850	680	635	615	555	570
Portugal	60	55	180	75	190	175	95	60	175	165	115	120		-
Romanía	40	90	100	85	50	80	115	140	195	420	280	290	:	*
Slovenia	15	270	205	30	55	35	40	120	115	90	190	140	4	*) *)
Slovakia	5	5	10	15	15	5	5	20	15	10	20	20	1).	\$6
Finland	1 010	855	360	385	340	350	360	475	510	335	315	310	8	2 02
Sweden	4 155	2 715	2 235	2 035	2 050	2 105	2 105	2 365	2 395	2 425	2 220	1 985	1 975	¥]
United King	3 705	3 295	3 150	3 550	3 255	3 110	2 905	3 160	3 280	2 935	3 120	3 325	4	:
Iceland	50	35	45	45	55	35	40	65	175	200	255	115	65	-
Liechtenste	0	5	5	10	10	5	10	0	10	10	5	10	*	+
Norway	415	255	300	245	215	265	265	305	280	280	235	420	480	320
Switzerland	3 620	2 700	1 990	1 740	1 880	2 325	2 470	2 435	2 175	2 090	1 960	1 760	1 585	1 500
Total	105 195	116 955	108 430	111 675	105 585	126 585	121 760	140 915	125 950	85 200	77 150	65 290	30 595	20 355


Source: Eurostat http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctzm&lang=en (20170322)

MAIN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF APPLICANTS IN THE $EU\!+$ in 2016



Source: Latest asylum trends – 2016 overview, p. 1 https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Latest%20Asylum%20Trends%20Overview%202016%20final.pdf

DECISIONS - RECOGNITION - NUMBERS AND RATES, EU+, 2016



Source: Latest asylum trends – 2016 overview, p. 3. https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Latest%20Asylum%20Trends%20Overview%202016%20final.pdf

CRISIS OR NOT?

SYRIA! (MARCH 15, 2017)



A Last Updated 15 Mar 2017

Source - UNHCR, Government of Turkey

Registered Syrian Refugees

OCCUPATION IN AN ADDRESS AND AN AN ADDRESS AND AN ADDRESS AND AN ADDRESS AND ADDRES

This figure includes 2 million Syrians registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and 🛛 Last Updated 15 Nar 2017 Lebanon, 2.9 million Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey, as well as more Source - UNHCR, Government than 29,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa. of Turkey

Danianal demonstration bosolulous halous in based on available data from Eaunt Joon

Total Syrian Asylum Applications in Europe

884,461 between Apr 2011 and Oct 2016 137,798 in 2014 only

Note - Data for 37 European countries which provide monthly information to UNHCR. To the extent possible, the figures reflect first time asylum applications, but some of the statistics are likely to include repeated applications (same or different country).

Top Countries



Sources: http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/migrant-crisis/focus-on-syrians/ (20170109) http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (20170322) author's assemblage (20170322)

Egypt:	120,154	Jordan:	657,000
Iraq:	233,224	Lebanon:	1,011,366
		Turkey:	2,910,281

IF CRISIS, WHOSE ?

This is not a European refugee crisis. It is the crisis of Syria, (and of Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Yemen)

Secondarily it is a crisis situation in the countries supporting the overwhelming majority of the refugees: Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey (+ Iran, Pakistan, Kenya etc.)

"Why Europe does not have a refugee crisis?"

Geoff Gilbert, p. 531

"[A]s far as this is a *European* refugee crisis, it is a crisis of the EU's own making, bearing in mind the flaws in its Common European Asylum System, both in set-up and implementation"

den Heijer, Maarten; Rijpma, Jorrit and Spijkerboer, Thomas, p. 625

"It has to be emphasized that the present European crisis is a crisis of refugee policy, not a refugee crisis."

den Heijer, Maarten; Rijpma, Jorrit and Spijkerboer, Thomas, p. 641

IF CRISIS, WHOSE?

"[T]he present refugee crisis represents not a crisis of numbers, but of policy. While the global number of refugees is currently at a historic high, the world's 21.3 million refugees still constitute less than 0.3 percent of the world's population. ... there is little to suggest that the current "crisis" in terms of refugee numbers and global protection capacity is an insurmountable challenge."

Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas and Tan, Nikolas F, p. 45

"What is experienced as the European refugee crisis is a crisis of European asylum and migration law. European refugee and migration law turned the displacement of Syrians into a crisis externally, by prohibiting refugees from travelling legally to the EU, by cooperating with neighbouring countries in order to contain them and by refusing to make a contribution sufficient for an even remotely viable alternative in countries in the region."

Battjes, Hemme; Brouwer, Evelien; Slingenberg, Lieneke and Spijkerboer, Thomas, p. 30

SOURCES OF MALFUNCTIONING OF THE CEAS

A DOZEN SYMPTOMS OF MALFUNCTIONING OF THE CEAS

- 1. Thousands of deaths at sea and inland
- The overall impression of a "crisis", which is seen as a European crisis
- 3. The tensions between Member States (e.g. Sweden-Denmark, Austria – Greece, Hungary – Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, etc.)
- 4. The uneasy relationship with Turkey
- 5. The grossly unfair participation in the provision of protection to refugees reaching to territory
- 6. The repeated, but so far largely fruitless sweeping legislative and political efforts, including negotiations with transit countries and states of the regions of origin and decisions to resettle and relocate refugees and asylum seekers

A DOZEN SYMPTOMS OF MALFUNCTIONING OF THE CEAS

- 7. The intention to (discriminately) select among asylum seekers according to their religion
- 8. The breakdown of the Dublin system
- The inability to return those persons who are not in need of international protection
- 10. Fences at the external and internal borders & reintroduction of border controls at Schengen internal borders
- 11. Increased and iliesal resort to detention repeatedly condemned by the European Court of Human Rights. Physical and verbal brutalisation of irregular migrants.
- 12. The increasing gap between the views of MS as to the future of CEAS

THE CAUSES OF FAILURE - DESIGN

The Dublin regime on determining the state whose duty is to conduct RSD: manifestly unjust, NOT burden sharing but shifting

Dublin: after family and visa/residence permit the external border crossed — perimeter states exposed to large numbers of application — Greece defaults in 2011, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria in 2015

Minimal tools of solidarity before 2015

- AMIF monetary
- EASO sending expert teams
- Temporary protection: voluntary offers to take over (never used)

THE CAUSES OF FAILURE - DESIGN

The system is based on coercion both in excluding the migrants of the EU territory and in transferring them to the responsible state under the Dublin regulation — that increases the role of the human smugglers in avoiding state control - prices go up leading to increased supply of smuggling **services** *increased* supply leads to falling **prices** *other* groups decide to make their way to Europe

THE CAUSES OF FAILURE - OVERLOAD AND UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION


Overload number of (first) applications, EU 27 or 28 + Iceland. Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland:

2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
341,795	373.550	464,505	662,165	1,322,145*	1,236,325

But:

Major groups with unlikely claims (Serbia, Kosovo, BiH, etc.)

* Only the formal applications submitted in Germany are included. Primary registration includes a further 600000 persons (altogether: 1.091.894) http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Fast-1-1-Millionen-Fluechtlinge-registriert-article16687996.html (20160313)



The Causes of Failure – Free Riding by Ignoring EU Law

Free rider member states

Greece, Italy, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria

Legal obligation derived from the EU acquis

Register claim + submit fingerprint to Eurodac + start Refugee Status Determination procedure + keep within territory + provide adequate reception conditions + return (remove) those without a right to stay and not applying for asylum

Actual practice: allowing to leave or actively transporting to next MS "waving through"

If Member States do not increase their relocations soon, and if the pressure on Greece and Italy is not alleviated. and the commission will not hesitate to make use of its Commission: Tenth report on relocation and resettlement COM(2017) 202 final, 2 March 2017, p. Not performing duties powers under the Treaties. under the two relocation decifrom September Not transposing the ons of the ouncil manner

"[A] group of newer Member States is resisting not only the idea of relocating asylum-seekers, but even the compromise suggestion of making an extra financial contribution in lieu of this. This is a flagrant breach of the burden-sharing principles of international and EU asylum law. Moreover, since these countries have benefited enormously from their citizens' refuge-seeking in and economic migration to other countries (both into and outside the EU) as well as a substantial inflow of EU funding, their position is morally untenable." Peers, Steve: The Refugee Crisis: What should the EU do next Entry of 8 September 2015 on the eulawanalysis.blogspot.com

Relocation before March 2017


RELOCATION (state of play as of 28 February 2017)

13 546 people have been relocated since the launch of the scheme

Member States	Relocated from Italy	Relocated from Greece	Member States	Relocated from Italy	Relocated from Greece
Austria	X	X	Lithuania	X	229
Belgium	58	338	Luxembourg	61	164
Bulgaria	X	29	Malta	46	50
Croatia	9	10	Netherlands	475	1011
Cyprus	10	55	Poland	X	X
Czech Republic	X	12	Portugal	275	810
Denmark	X	X	Romania	45	523
Estonia	×	87	Slovenia	23	101
Finland	504	560	Slovakia	X	16
France	282	2476	Spain	144	707
Germany	1070	1556	Sweden	39	X
Hungary	×	X	Liechtenstein	X	10
Ireland	X	320	Norway	415	249
Latvia	9	219	Switzerland	471	78
	Relocated		rom Italy	Relocated from Greece	
TOTAL		3 93	3 936 9 610		



Relocations from Italy and Greece (October 2015 - January 2017)



ADEQUATE RESPONSE, OR NOT?

THE TOOLS AVAILABLE BEFORE 2015

- Temporary protection Directive (2001/55 EC) " The Member States shall receive persons who are eligible for temporary protection in a spirit of Community solidarity. (§ 25)" NEVER APPLIED
- European Asylum Support Office (EASO) Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 – modest assistance in capacity building and ad hoc support by sending (small) asylum support teams, including to hotspots
- The Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 2014-2020 (seven years) total: 3 137 million Euros (in current prices)
- The Dublin regulation (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013) mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management, introduced in 2013 (Art. 33)
 NEVER APPLIED


ADRESSING THE DESIGN FAILURE

THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN DUBLIN IV. Automatic take back + Corrective allocation mechanism

- In take back situations only notification no request duty to take back. (Responsibility does not expire with time)
- Chapter VII: Corrective allocation mechanism
 - Disproportionate number of applications (after eligibility)
 - Exceeds 150 % of reference key (including resettled refugees)
 - Reference key = total of application in EU share by MS based on
 - population size 50 -50 % weight
 - total GDP
 - If unwilling to participate 250 000 Euros/per each applicant, who would have been allocated
 - Automated system

Funding – European Asylum Agency

EU budget response to the refugee crisis and increased migratory challenges



Transform EASO into European Union Agency for Asylum Much stronger agency

- Operate the reference key for Dublin IV,
- Take fingerprints for Eurodac, collect and process personal data.
- Monitor the implementation of CEAS,
- Intervene in the situation by its own (and delegated) staff when the Member State concerned fails to take remedial action.

Temporary protection = taboo

HOTSPOTS

Hotspots = in Italy and Greece: complex sites where experts from different EU MS work together in receiving and screening the applications and organising the return of those not in need of international protection. 4 in Italy, 5 in Greece.

ECRE conclusion, December 2016

"The hotspots have certainly not helped in relieving the pressure from Italy and Greece as was their stated objective: instead, they have led to an increase in the number of asylum applicants waiting in Italy and Greece, consolidating the challenges and shortcomings already inherent in the Dublin system. The hotspots approach has also led to more repressive measures, often disrespecting fundamental rights, which are applied by national authorities as a result of EU pressure to control the arrivals; yet despite EU pressure, it is the Member States that are held ultimately responsible for this implementation. The implementation of the EU-Turkey deal is a prime example of this EU pressure shifting responsibilities to the national level."

> ECRE: *The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece, p.* http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016..pdf

RELOCATION

New target number: 98,255 by September 2017

1

Not 160,000 "because 7,745 from the first Council Decision on relocation have yet to be allocated and because 54,000 from the second Council Decision will be used for resettlement from outside the EU rather than relocation within the EU. As a follow-up to the EU-Turkey Statement, a decision was adopted in September 2016 to make the 54,000 places that had not yet been allocated to Member States under the relocation decisions available for the purpose of legal admission of Syrians from Turkey to the EU. Out of the 98,255, 34,953 persons are to be relocated from Italy and 63,302 from Greece."

Commission fact sheet: Questions and Answers: Commission calls for renewed efforts in implementing solidarity measures under the European Agenda on Migration 2 March 2017

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-349_en.htm

COERCION

Coercion is not diminished

Intra EU

- Increased use of force within the EU (Illegal coercive removal without court control from the whole territory of Hungary, dismantling the Calais jungle, use of force at the Bulgarian-Turkish borders)

-Closing off the Western Balkan route by sheer force

-Repeated calls for reinforced border management ("protection") of the external border

Externally

- Enforced returns to volatile countries like Afghanistan, and to countries which may not be genuinely safe third countries (Turkey, Serbia, let alone Libya)

- Equipping Partnership Framework countries, like Niger with coercive tools to intercept irregular migrants

BURDEN SHARING WITHIN THE EU

Possible criteria of responsibility sharing/solidarity							
Applied by Criterion	Commission COM (2015) 450 final Crisis relocation mechanism	EU Council Relocation decision	Commission Dublin recast COM(2016) 270 final Corrective allocation mechanism	Germany Kőnigsteini key			
Total GDP	Yes	Yes	Yes	No			
GDP/fperson	(Yes)	(Yes)	No	No			
Tax income	No	No	No	Yes			
Population (size)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Territory	No	No	No	No			
Population density	No	No	No	No			
Unemployment	Yes	Yes	No	No			
Number of earlier applicants	Yes	Yes	No	No			
Physical proximity to country of origin (Neighbour, same region)	No	No	No	No			
Cultural proximity	No	No	No	No			

SOLIDARITY WITH THIRD STATES, COOPERATION, EXTERNALISATION

TRADITIONAL MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL COOPERATION FORMS IN MIGRATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

Cotonou Agreement (2000): 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states and the EU. (Expiry: 2020)

Khartoum process = EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative started in 2014, aimed at fighting irregular migration, human smuggling and trafficking

Rabat process = EU – Central and Western Africa + Tunisia and Algeria(observer) Established in 2006 – broad dialogue on migration and
developmenthttps://processus-de-rabat.org/en/

Afghanistan

EU – Afghanistan declaration "Joint Way Forward" soft law (non legally binding) document, Kabul, 2 October 2016

Libya

Italian – Libyan Memorandum of understanding of 2 February 2017

15 Return Agreements between the EU and other states (and territories Eastern Partnership mobility agreements

RESETTLEMENT FROM THIRD STATES

 The ad hoc decision of 20 July 2015 of the "Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council" (EU Doc 11130 /15) = Conclusions of the on resettling through multilateral and national schemes 20 000 persons in clear need of international protection

EU – Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016

1:1 Scheme – for a Syrian taken back from greece another Syrian refugee from Turkey to be resettled to the EU

- Union Resettlement Framework Commission Proposal of 13 July 2016 (COM (2016) 468 final
- Council in "Annual Union resettlement Plan"- sets
 - Annual maximum total number
 - Number of persons to be taken by each MS (based on their offers)
 - Geographic priorities
- Commission in "Targeted Union resettlement schemes" – sets
 - The actual number to be resettled by each state
 - Details of regions, specificities of cooperation
- MS choose the actual persons, who have to consent to the resettlement

Financial assistance

- Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa.
- Goals:
- foster stability in the regions;
- contribute to better migration management.
- by addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, by promoting economic and equal opportunities, security and development.
- 2 556 million Euros pledged

- EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis
- Countries covered: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, but also some Western Balkan states
- Improving education, livelihoods and health
- Goal: 1 000million Euros by 2017

THE EU-TURKEY "STATEMENT" – THE DEAL OF 18 MARCH 2016

- "[A]ny application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR"
- "All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion."
- "[T]emporary and extraordinary measure"
- "Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey"

Turkey suspended the implementation of that point in March 2017

THE EU-TURKEY "STATEMENT" - THE DEAL OF 18 MARCH 2016

- "For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria"
- Visa liberalisation among Schengen states for Turkey by the end of June 2016
- **Opening Chapter 33** in the accession negotiations
- 3 + 3 billion Euros for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey

THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK COM(2016) 385 FINAL 7 JUNE 2016

The short term objectives:

- save lives at sea;
- increase the rate of returns to countries of origin
- avoid embarking on dangerous journeys to reach Europe.

Long term objectives

- Address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement
- Provide reinforced EU support to third countries for capacity building and by advancing their political, social and economic situation.

CONCLUSION

DEMISE OR SOLIDARITY

GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY IS MORALLY IRRELEVANT – THEN WHO SHOULD PROVIDE THE PUBLIC GOOD OF PROTECTION GLOBALLY AND REGIONALLY?

Why would Lebanon be more obliged to protect Syrian refugees (or Iran to protect Afghanis, or Kenya Somalis, etc.) than Italy, Germany or Finland?

Protection globally is a public good to which every member state of the global community should contribute. Free riding is immoral and antisocial

Demise of solidarity

EU at present

Increases coercive tools

(keeping out, penalizing for entry, detaining, transferring between countries by force = more of the policy which did not work

- Pursues externalisation
- Struggles with finding a principle for (flexible) solidarity

"Deterrence paradigm" Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan

EU should "Sollen"

- See itself as a unified protection space
- Introduce significant resettlement quotas and/or humanitarian visas
- Contribute more to stopping the crises in the countries of origin
- Open up wider routes of regular immigration
- Effectively remove those without the right to stay

(SOME) AVAILABLE OPTIONS

Decision making on asylum requests at the European level by EU agencies, on behalf of the EU (K. Hailbronner, G Goodwin-Gill)

Decision making at national level under national law, but with the active and intensive participation of EU staff (Heijer, Rijpma, Spijkerboer)

Conceivable arrangement: asylum seekers choose their country of preference which conducts the RSD. All costs associated with the reception, the procedure, the integration or the removal are aggregated and redistributed across the EU

New York v. Valetta

- OUTCOME DOCUMENT FOR 19 SEPTEMBER 2016 HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO ADDRESS LARGE MOVEMENTS OF REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS
 - The New York Declaration, 19 September 2016
- The word "illegal" does not appear
- "4.5 We underline the centrality of international cooperation to the refugee protection regime. We recognize the burdens that large movements of refugees place on national resources, especially in the case of developing countries. To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States."

- Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route, 3 February 2017
- The words "refugee", "asylum" do not appear
- Priorities:
- a) Training and equipping Libyan border guard
- b) Disrupting smugglers' models and routes
- c) Enhancing resilience of local communities
- d) Reception capacities and conditions in Libya
- e) Support for IOM for voluntary returns
- f) Info campaigns in Libya and countries of origin
- g) Enhancing Libya's land border protection with neighbours
- h) Surveilling alternative routes
- i) Supporting Italy- Libya bilateral deals
- j) Dialogue and cooperation with Libya's neighbours on preventing departure and managing returns

The Hungarian prime minister's laudable postion

"I urge you, Secretary-General, to initiate negotiations on sharing this burden at a global level. All major stakeholders of international politics will have to take some of the migrants to their countries as part of a global quota system."

Statement by H.E. Mr. Viktor Orbán Prime Minister of Hungary at the High Level Side Event on "Strengthening cooperation on migration and refugee movements in the perspective of the new development agenda" 30 September 2015 United Nations New York at <u>http://un.newyork.gov.hu/accessibility/download/5/02/21000/Statement_of_Viktor_Orb%C3%A1n_High-</u> Level_Meeting_on_Migration.pdf (20170208)

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- den Heijer, Maarten; Rijpma, Jorrit and Spijkerboer, Thomas: Coercion, prohibition, and great expectations: the continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System, *Common Market Law Review* 53: 607–642, 2016.
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- Gilbert, Geoff: Why Europe does not have a refugee crisis, International Journal of refugee Law, Vol. 27 (2015) pp531 535
- Peers, Steve: The Refugee Crisis: What should the EU do next at: <u>http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.hu/2015/09/the-refugee-crisis-what-should-eu-do.html</u>

THANKS!

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